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Abstract 
 
We study the optimal provision of unemployment insurance (UI) in a framework that distinguishes between 
consumption and expenditure. We derive a “sufficient statistics” formula for optimal UI that is expressed 
terms of observable variables and can therefore be used in applied work. Recent research has shown that 
unemployed households pay less per unit of consumption than employed households. This finding has two 
counteracting effects on the optimal level of UI. On the one hand, consumption smoothing benefits 
identified from expenditure data overestimate the true marginal benefits of UI. On the other hand, UI 
benefits become more valuable because they buy more consumption when unemployed. In an optimal 
design, which effect dominates depends on the curvature of the utility function. We show that for relative 
risk aversion larger than one the first effect dominates, leading to lower levels of optimal UI. 
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1 Introduction
A central question in an unemployment insurance scheme is how generous the program
should be. Because providing consumption insurance distorts incentives to search for
a new job, optimal insurance design takes into account the efficiency costs induced by
moral hazard. These costs must be balanced against the welfare gains brought about by
insuring workers against consumption drops due to unemployment. From an empirical
perspective, the potential welfare gains of consumption-smoothing can be quantified by
the drop in consumption experienced upon unemployment. The size of this drop has
been estimated time and again—sometimes without a direct reference to unemployment
insurance—, for example by Cochrane (1991), Gruber (1997), Browning and Crossley
(2001), and Stephens (2001). A characteristic shared by these studies is that, because of
the data available, they focus on consumption expenditure (price times quantity) rather
than on consumption (quantity).
The neglect to empirically distinguish between consumption and expenditure may be
inconsequential if prices paid per unit of consumption do not differ between the employed
and the unemployed. If, however, part of the consumption drop at unemployment is due
to the unemployed paying lower prices, then the drop in expenditure will overstate the
drop in consumption. If this is the case, then potential consumption-smoothing benefits
will be exaggerated and, as a general rule, the calibration of optimal insurance levels
using empirical estimates based exclusively on expenditure data will be inaccurate.
The problem is not solely of an empirical nature. The fact that the unemployed pay
lower prices changes the social insurance design problem itself. Lower prices for the
unemployed imply that a dollar buys more consumption in the unemployed state of the
world than in the employed state of the world. Therefore, relative to a case in which
the price of consumption is constant across the employed and unemployed state, a social
planner would optimally choose to transfer more resources into the unemployed state
and therefore raise the degree of social insurance.
There is now a host of evidence that indicates that the unemployed pay lower prices
than their employed counterparts. This evidence suggests that activities such as shop-
ping and searching for bargains play a role in lowering prices. Using time use surveys,
Aguiar, Hurst, and Karabarbounis (2013) find that the unemployed devote more time to
shopping: in the United States, roughly 7 percent of the time freed up by market hours
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of work is dedicated to activities such as shopping for groceries and other household
items, comparison shopping, coupon clipping, and buying goods online. In comparison,
only between 2 and 6 percent of the time freed up is used to increase job search. Krueger
and Mueller (2012) corroborate this finding in an international sample by studying time
use surveys from 14 different countries.
Increased shopping time translates into lower prices. Using supermarket scanner data,
Aguiar and Hurst (2007) verify that increased shopping effort lowers the price paid for
grocery items while maintaining quality constant in the general population. Aguiar and
Hurst (2005) focus specifically on the unemployed and find that expenditure by the
unemployed falls more than consumption, indicating a reduction in the price paid per
unit of consumption.
In this paper we study how distinguishing between expenditure and consumption, affects
the level of optimal unemployment insurance. Acknowledging that expenditure is not
the same as consumption has two countervailing effects on the optimal benefit level. On
the one hand, optimal unemployment insurance takes into account that the unemployed
have access to lower prices in the unemployed state. Because a given dollar amount
buys more consumption in the unemployed state, from the perspective of a benevolent
social planner, it becomes worthwhile to transfer income from the good to the bad
state. This effect tilts the balance in favor of more generous unemployment benefits.
On the other hand, estimations that rely on expenditure data will over-estimate the
consumption-smoothing benefit of unemployment insurance because they disregard the
change in prices. A correct measurement therefore tilts the balance in the direction of
lower optimal unemployment benefits.
We formalize these ideas by adapting the standard normative model of social insurance
originally due to Baily (1978). Chetty (2006) showed that Baily’s setup captures the
main trade-offs that arise in fully intertemporal settings in the style of those considered
by Shavell and Weiss (1979) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997). The Baily-Chetty
model is part of a general class of models in public economics in which optimal policies
can be computed from a reduced number of sufficient statistics.1 In this model, opti-
mal unemployment benefits are described by a simple formula that involves only three
sufficient statistics: the magnitude of the consumption drop experienced at unemploy-
1A detailed analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the “sufficient statistics” approach, as
well as the history of its use in public economics, is provided by Chetty (2009). The famous dead-weight
loss calculation by Harberger (1964) is an early example of this approach.
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ment, the level of relative risk-aversion, and the elasticity of unemployment duration
with respect to the benefit level.
We depart from the Baily-Chetty model by allowing agents to endogenously choose how
much of the time freed up by not working they devote to shopping activities. By in-
creasing shopping time they reduce prices paid for consumption. The social planner sets
optimal unemployment benefits taking into account responses by workers, in particular
the endogenous choice of shopping time. As usual in this literature, because of the En-
velope Theorem, several endogenous choices do not have a first-order effect on optimal
benefit levels. An important feature of our model is that shopping affects state-prices
and therefore the implicit return of transferring resources across states faced by the
social planner.
In comparison to the standard first order condition of the social planner in the Baily-
Chetty model, marginal utility of the worker in the unemployed state is scaled upward by
the gross return of transferring resources across states. This first order condition could be
used to inform policy on the optimal level of unemployment insurance if consumption
were directly observable. Because consumption is usually not observed in real-world
data, we show how the optimality condition can be re-expressed in terms of expenditure.
If the worker’s preferences can be described by a constant relative risk-aversion (CRRA)
utility function, then optimal policy can be expressed in terms of expenditure in a gen-
eralized version of the standard Baily-Chetty formula. Whether optimal benefit levels
obtained from expenditure data should be revised upward or downward depends exclu-
sively in the degree of relative risk aversion. We show that, under the usual assumption
of relative risk aversion greater than one, estimations based on expenditure data sys-
tematically over-estimate the level of optimal unemployment benefits.
To illustrate the empirical relevance of our theoretical result, we calibrate our formula to
US data following the approach of Gruber (1997). We find that, when compared to the
standard Baily-Chetty formula, if the the price paid by the unemployed is 5% lower than
what the employed pay for their consumption, then, for levels of risk aversion slightly
above two, replacement rates are at least 10 percentage points lower. For example,
for a level of relative risk-aversion of 3, the optimal replacement rate according to the
standard formula is 38.6% whereas it is 25.7% in the formula that takes into account
the distinction between consumption and expenditure.
Because of the way the distinction between consumption and expenditure enters the
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social planner’s maximization problem, it will be of relevance not only for the canonical
Baily-Chetty model but also for the class of social insurance models that generalize their
environment and obtain similar “sufficient statistics” formulas. We show how the wedge
introduced by the distinction between consumption and expenditure can inform these
related models. Notably, this wedge does not depend on the elasticity measuring the
behavior that leads to moral hazard by the insured population. It is, however, influenced
by the difference in prices paid in the good and the bad state of the world. Therefore,
empirical research on economic shocks that distinguishes between consumption and ex-
penditure holds important insights for social insurance in general.
2 Model
We build on the two-period model used by Baily (1978) and Chetty (2006) to derive
their formula for optimal unemployment insurance. We extend the Baily-Chetty model
by distinguishing between consumption and expenditure and by allowing for additional
uses of free time. Unemployed workers can choose to use their free time on activities
that lower the price they pay for consumption.
2.1 The environment
There are two dates: 0 and 1. A risk-averse worker, who derives utility from consumption
and leisure, arrives at date 0 with assets A and lives for one period until date 1. At date
0, the worker may become unemployed with exogenous probability π and stays employed
with probability 1 − π. If employed, the worker supplies one unit of labor and obtains
a wage rate w. A worker who becomes unemployed stays unemployed for a fraction of
time D ∈ [0, 1], the unemployment duration, during which labor earnings are zero.
As in the Baily-Chetty model, unemployment insurance is parameterized by the pair
(b, τ), where b denotes the benefit received by an unemployed agent and τ is the tax
paid (only by fully employed workers) to sustain the insurance scheme. To maintain a
balanced budget, the unemployment insurance scheme must satisfy
(1− π)τ = πbD. (1)
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A benevolent planner chooses the parameters of the social insurance scheme so as to
maximize the worker’s welfare while maintaining budget balance and taking into account
the worker’s optimal response to the social insurance parameters b and τ .
2.2 Time allocation
Unemployed workers can influence the unemployment duration D by varying their job
search effort. Chetty (2006) did not directly model time use when unemployed and
posited a function that indirectly embeds the time costs of search and utility of leisure.
In his model, this function is assumed to be increasing in D and concave. Because we
consider the case in which agents have an additional use for their time, we focus in more
detail on the allocation of time when unemployed.
During the duration of unemployment D, the agent can allocate the time freed up by
not working to three alternative activities: leisure ℓ, job search tD, and price search tp.
These variables are measured as additional time spent on these activities net of time
already spent on them in the employed state. The time spent on these three activities
is limited by the following time constraint:
ℓ+ tD + tp ≤ D. (2)
That is, the sum of additional time spent on all three activities is bounded by total time
available D, the duration of unemployment.2
Leisure has a direct payoff in utility terms. Utility derived from the extra leisure when
unemployed is captured by the function ν(ℓ), with ν ′(·) < 0 and ν ′′(·) ≤ 0. We normalize
ν(0) = 0, so that ν(ℓ) measures utility gains over leisure enjoyed in the employed state.
Time spent on job search reduces the duration of unemployment. As in the model
of Chetty (2006), we assume that the agent controls the duration D deterministically.
This is captured by the relationship D = δ(tD). This function δ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] satisfies
δ′(·) < 0 and δ′′(·) > 0. Time spent on job search reduces the duration at a decreasing
rate. Analogously, time spent on the search for lower prices tp converts into prices
according to a function p = σ(tp), with σ
′(·) < 0 and σ′′(·) > 0. Shopping time reduces
prices, albeit at a decreasing rate. This functional form is directly motivated by the
2For employed workers this constraint holds trivially with D = ℓ = tD = tp = 0.
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existing literature that relates shopping effort to purchase prices (e.g., Aguiar and
Hurst, 2007).3
We normalize the price of the consumption good in the employed state to 1, so that
p ≤ 1 represents the relative price per unit of consumption in the unemployed state.4
Moreover, even if the agent uses all the available time on price search, goods cannot be
obtained for free. This is formalized by introducing a lower bound for prices at p > 0, so
that the function σ : [0, 1]→ [p, 1]. This lower bound on prices is important in ensuring
that consumption in the unemployed state is bounded away from infinity in the agent’s
maximization problem.
2.3 The worker’s and the planner’s problem
Taking the unemployment insurance parameter pair (b, τ) as given, the worker chooses
consumption in the employed state ce, consumption in the unemployed state cu, and
time allocations when unemployed {ℓ, tD, tp} to maximize expected utility defined as
(1− π)u(ce) + π{u(cu) + ν(ℓ)}. (3)
The choices of the worker are constrained by the time constraint (2) and two budget
constraints, one for each state,
A+ (w − τ)− ce ≥ 0, (4)
A+ bD + w(1−D)− pcu ≥ 0. (5)
The worker also takes into account how tD and tp affect D and p through the functions
D = δ(tD), p = σ(tp). (6)
Taking the optimal choices of the worker as given, the planner maximizes indirect utility
defined over the unemployment insurance parameter pair (b, τ) subject to the balanced
3Aguiar and Hurst (2007) postulate (and empirically verify in their data) a specification in which
the price paid is decreasing in shopping time, with the returns to shopping diminishing as shopping
intensity increases.
4Because for employed agents tp = 0, in terms of the function σ, this implies the normalization
σ(0) = 1.
7
budget constraint (1).
2.4 A simplified worker’s problem
To make the problem formally comparable to the model of Chetty (2006), we show how
the worker’s problem can be simplified. Non-satiation in leisure implies that (2) will
hold with equality. Moreover, because the functions δ and σ are strictly decreasing they
admit an inverse function. Using the time constraint, leisure can be expressed in terms
of these inverse functions and the variables D and p:
ℓ(D, p) = D − δ−1(D)− σ−1(p). (7)
Using (7), the leisure term in utility when unemployed can be expressed as a function
of D and p:
ν(ℓ(D, p)) ≡ ψ(D, p). (8)
The additive separability in (7), together with functional forms of ν, δ, and σ, imply for
ψ(D, p) that ψD > 0, ψDD < 0, ψp > 0, ψpp < 0, and ψDp ≤ 0.
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Using this substitution, the worker’s problem can be restated as the choice of consump-
tion when employed ce, consumption when unemployed cu, the duration of unemploy-
ment D, and the price p to maximize
(1− π)u(ce) + π{u(cu) + ψ(D, p)} (9)
subject to
A+ (w − τ)− ce ≥ 0 (10)
A+ bD + w(1−D)− pcu ≥ 0 (11)
Formally, the worker’s problem differs from the model of Chetty (2006) in the additional
choice variable p that appears in two places in the worker’s problem: in the utility
function inside the term ψ(D, p) and in the budget constraint of the unemployed. The
5Whether this last inequality is strict depends on the concavity of the leisure term in the utility
function. If ν′(·) < 0, then ψDp < 0; if ν
′(·) = 0, then ψDp = 0. In this last case, ν is linear and ψ(D, p)
can be written as the sum of two separate increasing and strictly concave functions ψ1(D) and ψ2(p).
8
model of Chetty (2006) is obtained as the special case in which p = 1 (meaning tp = 0).
In this case, ψ(D, 1) varies only with D (and is strictly increasing and concave in this
variable), and the relative price p effectively disappears from the budget constraint.
2.5 A characterization of optimal unemployment insurance
Let V (b, τ) stand for the indirect utility of the worker. The optimal unemployment
insurance scheme that satisfies budget balance is for the planner to choose b and τ to
maximize V (b, τ) subject to (1). The following proposition characterizes the first order
condition of the social planner’s problem.
Proposition 1 The marginal net benefit of a balanced-budget increase of b is given by
dV (b, τ(b))
db
= πD
[
1
p
u′(cu)− (1 + εD,b) u
′(ce)
]
, (12)
where εD,b is the elasticity of the duration of unemployment with respect to the unem-
ployment insurance benefit b:
εD,b =
b
D
dD
db
(13)
Proof. The indirect utility function that the planner maximizes can be written fully in
terms of b. Using the λe and λu to denote the Lagrange multipliers of the two budget
constraints in the worker’s problem, the indirect utility function V (b, τ(b)) is equal to
V (b, τ(b)) = maxce,cu,D,p,λe,λu(1− π)u(ce) + π{u(cu) + ψ(D, p)} (14)
+λe[A+ (w − τ(b))− ce] + λu[A+ bD + w(1−D)− pcu]
Because this expression is optimized over {ce, cu, D, p, λe, λu}, by the Envelope Theorem,
changes in these variables do not have first-order effects on V (b, τ(b)). Therefore,
dV (b, τ(b))
db
= −λe
dτ(b)
db
+ λuD (15)
Agent optimization implies
λe = (1− π)u
′(ce) (16)
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and
pλu = πu
′(cu) (17)
Finally, differentiating the government’s budget constraint,
dτ(b)
db
=
π
1− π
[
D + b
dD
db
]
. (18)
Substitute λe, λu, and the derivative
dτ(b)
db
in (15) using the first order conditions (16)
and (17), and (18). After these substitutions, and rearranging, (15) becomes
dV (b)
db
= πD
[
1
p
u′(cu)−
[
1 +
b
D
dD
db
]
u′(ce)
]
. (19)
Applying the definition of the elasticity, the exact expression in the Proposition is ob-
tained. q.e.d.
The resulting equation is formally equivalent to a formula with a state-dependent utility
function in which the marginal utility in the unemployed state is (endogenously) shifted
upward. Because purchasing consumption in the unemployed state costs only p ≤ 1,
transferring resources from the employed to the unemployed state has an endogenous
gross return of 1
p
≥ 1. Unless unemployed workers decide to spend absolutely no time
on shopping, this gross return is strictly greater than one.
In terms of economic intuition, the expression in (12) states that the value of an addi-
tional dollar in the unemployed state is proportional to the gross return of transferring
resources into that state times the marginal utility of consuming in that state: 1
p
u′(cu).
The cost of providing this additional dollar is the consumption foregone in the employed
state, which is measured by u′(ce) plus the behavioral effect u
′(ce)εD,b that takes into
account reduced job search effort.
In the case of an interior optimum, b∗ is implicitly defined by setting dV (b)
db
= 0. This
yields the following condition:
u′(cu)
u′(ce)
= p [1 + εD,b] . (20)
At the optimal benefit level the marginal rate of substitution is equal to the behavioral
elasticity of Baily (1978) and Chetty (2006) times the ratio of the endogenously chosen
state-prices p.
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Notably absent from the expression in (20) is the welfare cost related to reducing leisure
in order to free up time for shopping. This is not because it was not taken into account.
A first order condition for the unemployed worker equates the disutility from spending
more time on price search to the benefits arising from relaxing the budget constraint
in the unemployed state of the world.6 The reason is that the variables showing up in
(20) are sufficient statistics for the optimal benefit level. As is usual in the “sufficient
statistics” literature, all the information necessary to solve for the optimal benefit level
b∗ is embedded in the equilibrium values of a relatively small number of variables.
2.6 Optimal unemployment insurance in terms of consumption
expenditure
The optimality condition in (20) is not expressed in terms of observational data. The
empirical relationship between consumption and unemployment is usually estimated
from data on consumption expenditure, not consumption. We re-express the equation in
terms of observables. Expenditure in the unemployed state is c˜u = pcu and expenditure
in the employed state is c˜e = ce. In what follows we assume a CRRA specification, which
leads to u′(c) = c−γ , where γ > 0 is the level of relative risk aversion.
By using the CRRA specification, and taking logs on both sides, we arrive at a condition
purely in terms of observational data:
γ∆ log c˜ = log(1 + εD,b) + (1− γ) log p, (21)
where ∆ log c˜ ≡ log c˜e− log c˜u is the log-difference of expenditure between the employed
and the unemployed state.
The expression in (21) is an exact relationship. To compare it with the standard Baily-
Chetty formula, we can take a first-order approximation to this equation.7 Doing so
results in
γ
∆c˜
c˜
≈ εD,b + (1− γ)(p− 1). (22)
This expression generalizes the standard Baily-Chetty formula. Notice that if either
6In the worker’s problem, the first order condition with respect to p implies ψp = λucu.
7To obtain this approximation, on the left hand side of the expression, write ∆ log c˜ = log
(
1 + ∆c˜
c˜
)
.
Then, on both sides of the equation, use the approximation log(1 + z) ≈ z.
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p = 1 or γ = 1 (in either the exact or approximate expression), then the price p does
not play a role. In this case, the Baily-Chetty formula is obtained as a special case of
(22).
The case in which p = 1 has a straightforward explanation; if the unemployed are
unwilling or unable to lower the prices paid, because they do not spend time searching
for lower prices, then the distinction between consumption and expenditure becomes
irrelevant for the optimal choice of b. The second case, in which γ = 1 has a less
mechanical explanation. When the degree of risk-aversion is 1, preferences are equivalent
to a Cobb-Douglass utility function, which have a unitary elasticity of substitution.
Therefore, optimal expenditure choices do not respond to changes in relative prices and,
again, the distinction between consumption and expenditure becomes irrelevant for the
optimal choice of b.
If γ 6= 1 then optimal expenditure choices do respond to changes in relative prices.
The social planner internalizes the preferences of workers and therefore inherits their
desire to smooth or substitute consumption across states. At low levels of relative risk
aversion, when γ < 1, workers are relatively uninterested in smoothing consumption and
are willing to substitute from the good to the bad state of the world if the gross return
of doing so, 1
p
, is greater than one. Therefore, with γ < 1 the social planner will choose
optimal benefit levels b∗ that exceed those obtained from the standard formulation in
the Baily-Chetty model. However, virtually all calibrations consider levels of relative
risk-aversion γ > 1 more realistic. In this case, the result is reversed, and our formula
deviates from the standard formulation in the direction of lower optimal benefit levels
b∗. Therefore, for levels of relative risk aversion greater than one, estimations based
on expenditure data systematically over-estimate the level of optimal unemployment
benefits.
3 Application: the optimal replacement ratio
To gauge the practical importance of the distinction between consumption and expen-
diture we apply our condition describing the optimal unemployment insurance benefit
to the United States. We use the approach by Gruber (1997), who uses consumption
expenditure data to arrive at optimal replacement rates. Gruber’s method has been ex-
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tremely influential and has been widely used in applied work bearing on unemployment
insurance.8
Gruber (1997) estimates a linear relationship between the expenditure drop at unem-
ployment and the replacement rate r = b
w
of the form
∆ log c˜ = α + βr. (23)
In this expression, α > 0 measures the gap of expenditure across employment states in
the absence of unemployment benefits, and β < 0 measures how this gap is narrowed as
the replacement rate increases. Once these parameters have been estimated, substituting
Gruber’s specification into the above equation permits to isolate r as a function of the
elasticity of the duration with respect to benefits εD,b and the relative price p of a unit
of consumption in the unemployed state.
In our calculations we adopt the baseline estimates by Gruber (1997): αˆ = 0.222 and
βˆ = −0.265. With these estimates, consumption expenditure at average replacement
rates falls by roughly 10% when a worker enters unemployment. We follow the literature
and set the duration elasticity εD,b = 0.500. This value is based on the survey by Krueger
and Meyer (2002).9 We present results for a range of levels of relative risk-aversion γ
that go from 1 to 5.
To calibrate p, we use the results by Aguiar and Hurst (2005), who estimate the effect
of unemployment on food expenditure and food consumption for a cross-section of US
households. Aguiar and Hurst (2005) construct a consumption index to map quantity
data into a permanent income measure. In their sample, unemployment reduces food
expenditure by 19% and food consumption by 5%. This implies that in their data
almost three-quarters of the drop in expenditure are due to a lower price per unit of
consumption. With an average drop of 10% in expenditure caused by unemployment,
the corresponding value for p would be 0.925.
The 19% drop in expenditure due to unemployment estimated by Aguiar and Hurst
(2005) is relatively large compared to the usual estimates, which hover around 10%
(e.g., Stephens, 2001). Assuming that their consumption index is correctly estimated,
8Recent examples of studies using Gruber’s approach include Browning and Crossley (2001) and
Bronchetti (2012).
9In the Appendix we re-calculate our results for εD,b = 0.432, the value preferred by Gruber (1997),
using the linear approximation in (22).
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we therefore believe that p = 0.950 might be a more likely value.10 In Table 1 we present
optimal replacement rates calculated for the whole range of values that go from no price
drop (p = 1.000) to a 10 percent price drop (p = 0.900). This last value implies that the
fall in expenditure is entirely due to the price change.
Table 1: Optimal replacement ratio
Level of RRA Relative price ratio p
γ 1.000 0.975 0.950 0.925 0.900
1.0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.0 0.160 0.112 0.063 0.013 0.000
2.5 0.296 0.238 0.180 0.119 0.057
3.0 0.386 0.322 0.257 0.190 0.121
3.5 0.451 0.382 0.312 0.240 0.167
4.0 0.499 0.427 0.354 0.278 0.201
5.0 0.567 0.490 0.412 0.331 0.249
The first column of Table 1 shows the optimal replacement ratio as a function of relative
risk-aversion in the case in which the distinction between consumption and expenditure
is irrelevant (p = 1). The values in this column are approximately equal to those of
Gruber (1997, p. 203, Table 4, Col. 1). The difference with Gruber’s values is explained
by our use of the exact expression in (21) rather than the linear approximation, and by
our slightly higher choice of εD,b.
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As we move to the columns on the right, increasing the gap between consumption and
expenditure, optimal replacement ratios decrease and it becomes more difficult to rec-
oncile the replacement rates with those prevailing in the US assuming reasonable values
of relative risk-aversion. For example, for p = 0.950 it takes a value of γ of almost 5 to
reach an optimal replacement rate of 40%.
10Aguiar and Hurst (2005, pp. 943–944) make a comment that goes in this direction when they
compare their consumption index to the 9% drop in earnings six or more years after the onset of
unemployment uncovered by Stevens (1997). Their reason for confronting their index with long-term
earnings is that the consumption index is expressed in terms of permanent income dollars.
11In the Appendix we show that Gruber’s results are exactly replicated once these changes are undone.
14
3.1 The consumption-expenditure wedge
How exactly is the optimal replacement rate impacted by the distinction between con-
sumption and expenditure? Using (21) and (23), the optimal replacement ratio can be
written as
r∗(p) = r∗(1) +
1− γ
γβˆ
log p. (24)
The value r∗(1) corresponds to the replacement ratio if the distinction between con-
sumption and expenditure were neglected (this is equivalent to assuming p = 1) whereas
r∗(p) is the correct replacement ratio. We define the consumption-expenditure wedge
CEW as
CEW (p; γ, β) ≡ r∗(p)− r∗(1) =
1− γ
γβˆ
log p. (25)
Focusing on the wedge CEW is informative for a wider class of models that extend the
original Chetty-Baily setup. These models lead to versions of (20) that include small
variations but are overall similar to it.12 Because p shows up in the optimization problem
multiplying the marginal utility of consumption when unemployed, it is bound to show
up in a way similar to (20) in generalizations of the standard Baily-Chetty formula.
The CEW is solely a function of p and parameters γ and β. This dependence on a
reduced set of parameters is interesting also from a purely empirical perspective. The
calculations in Table 1 are influenced by variables that have only ‘level effects’ and do
therefore not show up in the wedge. The duration elasticity εD,b is one such variable.
The other one is α. Whereas there exists some degree of consensus on the value of εD,b,
this is not the case with α.13
The parameter α measures the drop in expenditure that workers in the US would face in
the absence of unemployment insurance. Of course, this is a counter-factual experiment
that is never observed in real life. The estimated value of α is an extrapolation that owes
its existence to the linear specification that was originally assumed by Gruber (1997),
and which is reflected in equation (23). The slope parameter β, on the other hand, is
identified primarily from local variation inside the range of values that are observed in
12Several of these studies are surveyed by Chetty and Finkelstein (2013, Section 3).
13There is still some uncertainty surrounding the correct value of εD,b. For example, some calibrations
use values close to 0.75 whereas recent research by Meyer and Mok (2014) suggests a values in the range
0.1–0.2.
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the data. By focusing on CEW we therefore strip the empirical implications of our
model from ‘level effects’ that can be a nuisance.
In Table 2 we show how the wedge depends on the choices of the relative risk-aversion
parameter and the value of p. The values in this table show how much the optimal
Table 2: Optimal replacement ratio: deviations from a canonical Baily-Chetty formula
Level of RRA Relative price ratio p
γ 1.000 0.975 0.950 0.925 0.900
1.0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.5 0.000 -0.032 -0.065 -0.098 -0.133
2.0 0.000 -0.048 -0.097 -0.147 -0.199
2.5 0.000 -0.057 -0.116 -0.177 -0.239
3.0 0.000 -0.064 -0.129 -0.196 -0.265
3.5 0.000 -0.068 -0.138 -0.210 -0.284
4.0 0.000 -0.072 -0.145 -0.221 -0.298
5.0 0.000 -0.076 -0.155 -0.235 -0.318
replacement rate needs to be reduced if the distinction between consumption and ex-
penditure is neglected as in the standard Baily-Chetty formula.
The values in this table confirm that the wedge is very sensitive to p. From the definition
of CEW in (25), for γ > 1 the wedge is always negative. The logarithmic function implies
that departures of the price p away from 1 lead to an effect on the wedge of increasing
magnitude. This high sensitivity to p highlights the need of having estimates of the
parameter p as precise as possible to calibrate optimal replacement rates.
4 Concluding Remarks
We have shown how the provision of optimal unemployment insurance is affected by
the distinction between consumption and expenditure. By extending the Baily-Chetty
model we derived a “sufficient statistics” formula for optimal unemployment insurance
that is expressed in terms of observable variables and can therefore be readily used in
applied work.
For levels of relative risk-aversion that exceed one, our formula indicates that optimal
unemployment insurance benefits are lower when the distinction between consumption
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and expenditure is taken into account. A calibration to US data suggests that the effect
of this distinction on the magnitude of optimal replacement rates is quantitatively large.
There is abundant evidence on the magnitude of expenditure drops at unemployment
for the US and for several other countries. In comparison, the evidence on price changes
upon unemployment is still relatively scarce, with the possible exception of the US. Still,
even in the case of the US, important research lies ahead. The evidence so far is for a
reduced number of items (typically groceries) and is based on cross-sectional data. To
calibrate the value of p, ideally, one would want to use panel-data estimates of prices
paid on a wide range of goods by households transitioning into unemployment.
How much consumption-smoothing is achieved is an important attribute of any unem-
ployment insurance scheme. In this paper we have shown that to correctly quantify the
benefits of consumption-smoothing it is necessary to distinguish between consumption
and expenditure. Because many social insurance programs have consumption insur-
ance at their heart, this distinction will be relevant not only for the design of optimal
unemployment insurance, but for social insurance programs in general.
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5 Appendix: results for the linear approximation
Because the results by Gruber (1997) are frequently used in applied work, we calculate
comparable optimal replacement ratios using the linear approximation and parameter
values assumed by Gruber (1997). In his calculations, Gruber (1997) assumed a duration
elasticity εD,b of 0.432 and used the linear approximation in (22). Table 3 exhibits
optimal replacement ratios that are comparable to those in Table 4 of Gruber (1997).
Table 3: Optimal replacement ratio using the linear approximation and same parameter values
as Gruber (1997)
Level of RRA Relative price ratio p
γ 1.000 0.975 0.950 0.925 0.900
1.0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.0 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.5 0.186 0.129 0.072 0.016 0.000
3.0 0.294 0.231 0.169 0.106 0.043
3.5 0.372 0.305 0.237 0.170 0.102
4.0 0.430 0.359 0.289 0.218 0.147
5.0 0.512 0.436 0.361 0.285 0.210
The values in the first column, in which p = 1, replicate the values in the column denoted
as the ‘Base Case’ in Table 4 of Gruber (1997). In comparison with Table 1, optimal
replacement ratios are slightly lower than in Table 1 despite of the use of a slightly
lower duration elasticity. The reason for this is the linear approximation error: in the
approximation, Gruber (1997) sets εD,b = 0.432 whereas the exact formula is effectively
using log(1 + 0.500) = 0.405.
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